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Abstract
We provide an analytic, microscopic analysis of extreme events in
an adaptive population comprising competing agents (e.g. species, cells,
traders, data-packets). Such large changes tend to dictate the long-term
dynamical behaviour of many real-world systems in both the natural and
social sciences. Our results reveal a taxonomy of extreme events, and pro-
vide a microscopic understanding as to their build-up and likely duration.
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Large unexpected changes or ‘extreme events’ (e.g. crashes in financial mar-
kets, or punctuated equilibria in evolution) happen infrequently, yet tend to dic-
tate the long-term dynamical behaviour of real-world systems in disciplines as
diverse as biology and economics, through to ecology and evolution. The ability
to generate large internal, so-called endogenous changes is a defining character-
istic of complex systems, and arguably of Nature and Life itself [1, 2, 3]. Such
changes are manifestations of subtle, short-term temporal correlations resulting
from internal collective behaviour. They seem to appear out of nowhere and
have long-lasting consequences. To what extent can they ever be ‘understood’?
Followers of the self-organized criticality view [3] would claim this question is
na¨ive because of an inherent self-similarity in Nature: any large changes are
simply magnified versions of smaller changes, which are in turn magnified ver-
sions of even smaller changes, and so on. Such self-similarity is presumed to
underlie the power-law scaling observed in natural, social and economic phe-
nomena [3]. However, there are reasons for believing that the largest changes
may be ‘special’ in a microscopic sense [2]. Power-law scaling is only approx-
imately true, and does not apply over an infinite range of scales. Apart from
being atomistic at the smallest scale, a population of competing agents can-
not cause any effect larger than the population size itself: in short, the largest
changes will tend to ‘scrape the barrel’ in some way. Reference [2] quotes Bacon
from Novum Organum: “Whoever knows the ways of Nature will more easily
notice her deviations; and, on the other hand, whoever knows her deviations
will more accurately describe her ways”.
This paper addresses the task of understanding, and eventually controlling,
the large endogenous changes arising in a complex adaptive system comprising
competing agents (e.g. species, cells, traders, data-packets). Our work reveals a
taxonomy of large changes, and provides a quantitative microscopic description
of their build-up and duration. Our results also provide insight into how a
‘complex systems manager’ might contain or control such extreme events.
We consider a generic complex system in which a population of Ntot hetero-
geneous agents with limited capabilities and information, repeatedly compete
for a limited global resource. Our model was introduced in Ref. [4], and is a
generalization of the El Farol bar problem and the Minority game, concerning
a population of people deciding whether to attend a popular bar with limited
seating [5]. At timestep t, each agent (e.g. a bar customer, or a market trader)
decides whether to enter a game where the choices are option 1 (e.g. attend the
bar, or buy) and option 0 (e.g. go home, or sell): N0 agents choose 0 while N1
choose 1. The ‘excess demand’ D[t] = N1−N0 (which mimics price-change in a
market) and number V [t] = N1 +N0 of active agents (which mimics volume of
market orders) represent output variables. These two quantities fluctuate with
time, and can be combined to construct other global quantities of interest for the
complex system studied (e.g. summing the price-changes gives the current price).
This model can reproduce statistical and dynamical features similar to those in a
real-world complex adaptive system, namely a financial market [4], and exhibits
the crucial feature of seemingly spontaneous large changes of variable dura-
tion [4, 6]. The resulting time-series appears ‘random’ yet is non-Markovian,
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with subtle temporal correlations which put it beyond any random-walk based
description. The temporal correlations of price-changes and volume, and their
cross-correlation, are of intense interest in financial markets where so-called
chartists offer a wide range of rules-of-thumb [7] such as ‘volume goes with price
trend’. Although such rules are unreliable, the intriguing question remains as
to whether there could in principle be a ‘science of charting’.
A subset V [t] ≤ Ntot of the population, who are sufficiently confident of
winning, are active at each timestep. For N1 < N0 the winning decision is 1
and vice-versa, i.e. the winning decision is given by H [−D[t]] where H [x] is the
Heaviside function. The global resource level is so limited, or equivalently the
game is so competitive, that at least half the active population lose at each
timestep [5]. The only global information available to the agents is a common
bit-string ‘memory’ of the m most recent outcomes. Consider m = 2; the
P = 2m = 4 possible history bit-strings are 00, 01, 10 and 11, which can also
be represented in decimal form: µ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , P − 1}. A strategy consists
of a response, aµ ∈ {−1, 1} to each possible bit-string µ, aµ = 1 ⇒ option
1, and aµ = −1 ⇒ option 0. Hence there are 2P = 16 possible strategies.
The heterogeneous agents randomly pick s strategies each at the outset, and
update the scores of their strategies after each timestep with the reward function
χ[D] = sgn[−D], i.e. +1 for choosing the minority action, −1 for choosing the
majority action. Agents have a time horizon T over which strategy points are
collected, and a threshold level r which mimics a ‘confidence’. Only strategies
having ≥ r points are used, with agents playing their highest scoring strategy.
Agents with no such strategy become temporarily inactive [4]. We focus on the
regime where the number of strategies in play is comparable to the total number
available, since this yields seemingly random dynamics with occasional large
movements [4, 6]. The coin-tosses used to resolve ties in decisions (i.e. N0 =
N1) and active-strategy scores, inject stochasticity into the game’s evolution.
Reference [8] showed that a simplified version of this system in the limit r → −∞
and T →∞, can be usefully described as a stochastically disturbed deterministic
system. We are interested in the dynamics of large changes, and adopt the
approach and terminology of Ref. [8]. Averaging over our model’s stochasticity
yields a description of the game’s deterministic dynamics via mapping equations
for the strategy score vector S[t] and global information µ[t]. For s = 2 the
deterministic dynamics are given exactly by the following equations:
S[t] = S[0]−
t−1∑
i=t−T
aµ[i] sgn [D[i]] , (1)
µ[t] = 2µ[t− 1]− PH [µ[t− 1]− P/2] +H [D[t− 1]] .
The corresponding demand function is given by
D[t] =
2P∑
R=1
a
µ[t]
R H [SR − r]
2P∑
R′=1
(1 + sgn [SR[t]− SR′ [t]])ΨR,R′ ,
where Ψ is the symmetrized strategy allocation matrix which constitutes the
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quenched disorder present during the system’s evolution [8]. Elements ΨR,R′
enumerate the number of agents holding both strategy R and R′. The volume
V [t] is given by the same expression as D[t] replacing a
µ[t]
R by unity.
Large changes such as financial market crashes, seem to exhibit a wide range
of possible durations and magnitudes making them difficult to capture using
traditional statistical techniques based on one or two-point probability distri-
butions [2]. A common feature, however, is an obvious trend (i.e. to the eye) in
one direction over a reasonably short time window: we use this as a working def-
inition of a large change. In fact, all the large changes discussed here represent
> 3σ events. In both our model and the real-world system, these large changes
arise more frequently than would be expected from a random-walk model [1, 2].
Our model’s dynamics can be described by trajectories on a de Bruijn graph [8]:
see Fig. 1 for m = 3, with a transition incurring an increment to the score vector
S. There are P orthogonal increment vectors aµ, one for each node µ. Setting
the initial scores S[0] = 0, the strategy score vector in Eq. (1) can be written
exactly as:
S[t] = c0a
0 + c1a
1 + . . .+ cP−1a
P−1 =
P−1∑
j=0
cja
j
where cj represents the nodal weights for history node µ = j. The nodal weights
enumerate the number of negative return transitions from node µ minus the
number of positive return transitions, in the time window t − T → t − 1.
High absolute nodal weight implies persistence in transitions from that node
i.e. persistence in D|µ. Large changes will occur when connected nodes become
persistent. The simplest type of large movement exhibiting perfect nodal per-
sistence would be µ = 0, 0, 0, 0, . . . in which all successive price changes are in
the same direction. We call this a ‘fixed-node crash’ (or rally). However, there
are many other possibilities reflecting the wide range of forms and durations of
the large change. For example, on the m = 3 de Bruijn graph in Fig. 1 the
cycle µ = 0, 0, 1, 2, 4, 0, . . . has four out of the five transitions producing price-
changes of the same sign (it is persistent on nodes 1, 2, 4 and antipersistent
on node 0). We call this a ‘cyclic-node crash’ (or rally). Figure 2 illustrates
a large change which starts as a fixed-node crash then subsequently becomes
a cyclic-node crash. Cyclic-node crashes can be treated simply as interlocking
fixed-node crashes, hence for clarity we focus here on a single fixed-node crash
(or rally). For the parameter ranges of interest, the choice about whether a
strategy is played by an agent is more determined by whether that strategy’s
score is above the threshold, than whether it is their highest-scoring strategy [9].
This is because agents are only likely to have at most one strategy whose score
lies above the threshold for confidence levels r ≥ 0. Making the additional
numerically-justified approximation of small quenched disorder (i.e. the vari-
ance of the entries in the strategy allocation matrix Ψ is smaller than their
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mean for the parameter range of interest [8]), the demand and volume become:
D[t] =
N
4P
2P∑
R=1
a
µ[t]
R sgn [SR[t]− r] , (2)
V [t] =
N
2
+
N
4P
2P∑
R=1
sgn [SR[t]− r] . (3)
Suppose persistence on node µ = 0 starts at time t0. How long will the
resulting crash last? To answer this, we decompose Eq. (2) into strategies which
predict 1 at µ = 0, and those that predict 0. We first consider the particular
case where the node µ = 0 was not visited during the previous T timesteps,
hence the loss of score increment from time-step t − T will not affect S[t] on
average. At any later time t0 + τ during the crash, (i.e. µ = 0) Eqs. (2) and (3)
are hence given by:
D[t0 + τ ] = − N
4P


∑
R∋aµ
R
=−1
sgn [SR[t0]− r − τ ]−
∑
R∋aµ
R
=1
sgn [SR[t0]− r + τ ]

 ,
(4)
V [t0 + τ ] =
N
2
+
N
4P


∑
R∋aµ
R
=−1
sgn [SR[t0]− r − τ ] +
∑
R∋aµ
R
=1
sgn [SR[t0]− r + τ ]

 .
|D[t0 + τ ]| decreases as the persistence time τ increases, and hence the crash
ends at time t0 + τc when the right-hand side of Eq. (4) changes sign. The
persistence time or ‘crash-length’ τc is thus given by the mean of the scores
of the strategies predicting 0, i.e. τc = SR∋aµ
R
=−1[t0] = −c0[t0]. In the more
general case where the node µ = 0 was visited during the previous T timesteps,
τc is given by the largest τ value which satisfies:
τ = −

c0[t0] +∑
{t′}
sgn [D[t′]]


where {t′} ∋ (µ[t′] = 0∩t0−T ≤ t′ ≤ t0+τ−T ). Assume that the scores have a
near-Normal distribution, i.e. SR∋aµ
R
=−1[t0] ∼ N[S−1, σ] as in Fig. 3a. For each
strategy R there exists an anticorrelated strategy R and hence SR[t] = −SR[t]
for all t. Consequently, prior to a crash, the score distribution tends to split
into two halves as indicated schematically in Fig. 3a. The expected demand
(and volume) during the crash are then:
< D[t0 + τ ] > ∝
(
erf
[
c0[t0] + r + τ√
2σ
]
− erf
[−c0[t0] + r − τ√
2σ
])
< V [t0 + τ ] > ∝
(
2− erf
[
c0[t0] + r + τ√
2σ
]
− erf
[−c0[t0] + r − τ√
2σ
])
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These forms are illustrated in Figure 3b. As the spread in the strategy score
distribution is increased, the dependence of < D > and < V > on the parame-
ters τ and r becomes weaker and the surfaces flatten out leading to a smoother
drawdown, as opposed to a sudden severe crash. As the parameters S−1, σ, r are
varied, it can be seen that the behaviour of the demand and volume during the
crash can exhibit markedly different qualitative forms [9], yielding a taxonomy
of different species of large change even within the same single-node family. This
result could explain why financial market chartists’ rules-of-thumb [7], such as
‘volume goes with price trend’, are far too simplistic.
We now turn to the important practical question of whether history will
repeat itself, i.e. given that a crash has recently happened, is it likely to happen
again? If so, is it likely to be even bigger? Suppose the system has built up
a negative nodal weight for µ = 0 at some point in the game (see Fig. 4a).
It then hits node µ = 0 at time t0 producing a crash (Fig. 4b). The nodal
weight c0 is hence restored to zero (Fig. 4c). In this model the previous build-
up is then forgotten because of the finite T score window, hence c0 becomes
positive (Fig. 4d). The system then corrects this imbalance (Fig. 4e), restoring
c0 to 0. The crash is then forgotten, hence c0 becomes negative (Fig. 4f). The
system should therefore crash again - however, a crash will only re-appear if the
system’s trajectory subsequently returns to node µ = 0. Interestingly, we find
that the disorder in the initial distribution of strategies among agents (i.e. the
quenched disorder in Ψ) can play a deciding role in the issue of crash ‘births and
revivals’ since it leads to a slight bias in the outcome, and hence the subsequent
transition, at each node. When cµ[t] = 0 (see Fig. 4c), it follows that sgn[D[t]]
is more likely to be equal to sgn
[
aµ[t] · x] where x = ∑2PR′=1ΨR′ is a strategy
weight vector with xR corresponding to the number of agents who hold strategy
R [9]. The quenched disorder therefore provides a crucial bias for determining
the future trajectory on the de Bruijn graph when the nodal weight is small,
and hence can decide whether a given crash recurs or simply disappears. The
quenched disorder also provides a catalyst for building up a very large crash.
Our work opens up the study of how a ‘complex-systems-manager’ might
use this information to control the long-term evolution of a complex system by
introducing, or manipulating, such large changes. As an example, we give a
quick three-step solution to prevent large changes: (1) use the past history of
outcomes to build up an estimate of the score vector S[t] and the nodal weights
{cµ[t]} on the various critical nodes, such as µ = 0 in the case of the fixed-node
crash. (2) Monitor these weights to check for any large build-up. (3) If such
a build-up occurs, step in to prevent the system hitting that node until the
weights have decreased.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1: Dynamical behaviour of the global information is described by
transitions on the de Bruijn graph. Graph for population of m = 3 agents.
Blue transitions represent positive demand D, red transitions represent negative
demand.
Figure 2: Dynamical behaviour of complex system (e.g. price P [t] in fi-
nancial market) described by evolution of nodal weights cµ. History at each
timestep indicated by black square. Large change preceded by abnormally high
nodal weight. Large change incorporates fixed-node and cyclic node crashes
Figure 3: (a) Schematic representation of strategy score distribution prior
to crash. Arrows indicate subsequent motion during crash period. (b) Plots
of expected demand and volume during crash period showing range of different
possible behaviour as system parameters are varied.
Figure 4: Representation of how large changes can recur due to finite memory
of agents. Grey area shows history period outside agents’ memory. Example
shows recurring fixed-node crash at node µ = 0.
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